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ABSTRACT 
 
In an earlier article, we reported the results of a classroom experiment simulating price 
competition in an oligopoly with differentiated goods.  That study raised some questions that we 
were unable to address at that time.  For this current study, we have adapted the experiment to 
further explore the effects of scarcity in the input markets, and to study the effects of price controls 
in these markets.  We find that scarcity in an input market has the expected directional effect on 
prices in both input and output markets, but not necessarily the magnitude expected; we further 
find that price controls have only some of the effects expected.  In the current experiment, we 
increased the number of rounds of the game to allow more opportunity for convergence to a stable 
outcome, and to allow for three distinct phases of the game: initial rounds in which inputs were 
abundantly available, subsequent rounds in which one input’s supply was dramatically reduced, 
and final rounds in which a price floor was established on the one input which remained 
abundant.  As expected, firms played Nash/Bertrand strategies in the early rounds.  However, the 
shock caused by reducing the availability of capital took many rounds for full adjustment, with 
both output prices and the equilibrium rental rate of capital rising consistently and gradually 
toward their projected equilibria over ten rounds, although even then capital prices did not rise 
enough to absorb all firm profits.  Surprisingly, establishing a minimum wage did not have the 
anticipated effect of balancing payments between labor and capital; instead, the minimum wage 
completely disrupted the trend of an increasing rental price of capital and reduced it to zero, 
while creating volatility in profits without consistently eliminating them.  Overall, we find that 
most of our anticipated results ultimately obtain, but adjustments to variations in market 
conditions are neither immediate nor perfectly consistent with the predictions of theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n an earlier article, we reported the results of a classroom experiment simulating price competition in an 
oligopoly with differentiated goods (Waldron, Allgrunn, and Pei, 2010).  The original contribution of that 
paper was the incorporation of input markets into the more common analysis of oligopolistic markets for 
a final good.  We were interested in both the pedagogical value of the experiment as well as the results of the 
experiment itself; we found that the experiment enhanced learning, and that for the most part, the results conformed 
to the expectations generated by our model.  However, that study also raised some questions that we were unable to 
address at that time.  For this current study, we have adapted the experiment to further explore the effects of scarcity 
in the input markets, and to study the effects of price controls in these markets.  We find that scarcity in an input 
market has the expected directional effect on prices in both input and output markets, but not the magnitude 
expected; we further find that price controls have only some of the effects expected. 
 
Since Vernon Smith’s (1962) seminal work, many authors have used experimentation to test theories about 
market behavior.  Some of these have focused on oligopoly simulations and price competition.  Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy (2000) look at price competition, as do Kruse et al. (1994).  With classroom experiments like ours, many 
authors also assess pedagogical effectiveness (see, for example, Gremmen and Potters, 1997; Holt, 1999; Ortmann, 
2003; and Kruse et al., 2005).  In this current paper, we do not attempt to measure the benefit of the experiment for 
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teaching purposes, but we do note that this work emerges from our pedagogical efforts in managerial and labor 
economics.  No other studies that we are aware of integrate factor markets in a way that is similar to what we do. 
 
BACKGROUND  
 
For the original experiment, we created a game simulating an environment in which three firms acted as 
Bertrand competitors in the market for their output, for which we assumed interdependent demand functions 
reflecting significant but imperfect substitutability between the goods.  We further assumed that the firms used 
identical Leontief production techniques with capital and labor, which had to be procured in input markets.  Firms 
bid for inputs, which were supplied to the market perfectly inelastically.  The experiment featured repeated rounds 
of the game, and in each round firms submitted a demand schedule for their inputs and set a price for their output.  
We wrote a computer program to resolve the game, determining the market demands for each firm’s output and the 
equilibrium price for each input, along with each firm’s production capacity, depending on the factors each had 
obtained based on their bids.  Firms were assumed to sell the lesser of the demand for their output and their 
production capacity, and the computer program then reported profits for each round. 
 
 Our primary interest in the initial experiment, besides evaluating its pedagogical value for student learning, 
was to observe how well the usual Bertrand models and Nash equilibrium predict firm behavior, particularly when 
we introduce scarcity in the input markets.  While classroom experiments with oligopolistic price competition are 
probably widely used, we are unaware of any that also incorporate input markets at the same time.  We began the 
earlier experiment by having both inputs supplied at abundant quantities that should easily have enabled firms to 
obtain all the factors desired at zero or nearly zero cost, and we expected to observe firms play the Nash/Bertrand 
strategies that obtain under costless production conditions.  In fact, this is almost precisely what the experiment 
participants did.   
 
We then moved to a number of rounds in the game in which one of the factors (labor) became significantly 
scarcer.  We expected to see the market prices for output rise dramatically, and we expected the firms to bid up the 
price of the scarce input to the point that wage payments for the labor absorbed all the potential profits.  We derived 
the equilibrium of the game based on a symmetrical distribution of the inputs among the three firms and rationalized 
the zero-profit output by noting that each firm had an incentive to bid higher for the scarce input until the wage rate 
reached the output price.  The game is complicated significantly by the simultaneous choices of output price and 
input bids, but we anticipated that firms would bid away profits in search of scarce inputs in much the same way that 
firms in Bertrand competition bid away profits by lowering their output price.  The result is interesting and novel, 
because Bertrand competitors with differentiated products that are able to produce at constant cost (as, say, price 
takers in input markets) are generally found to earn positive economic profits.  The initial experiment was designed 
to test whether in fact this anticipated result obtained in practice. 
 
The results of the earlier experiment were mixed: firms in the rounds with abundant inputs did in fact move 
quickly towards the Nash/Bertrand predicted price levels, and when input scarcity was introduced, output prices rose 
and the equilibrium price of the scarce input increased as well.  However, while the scarce input’s price rose 
consistently, it never reached the levels we predicted.  Here we effectively replicate the conditions of the first 
experiment, but extend the number of rounds played to allow more time for convergence to a stable outcome.  We 
then extend the experiment further to test the effects of price controls in an input market. 
 
MODEL AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
 For consistency in our analysis, we continue to use the same experimental framework developed in our 
previous study.  We assume these linear demand functions: 
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for the firms a, b, and c.  Each firm faces a production function showing output produced by capital and labor in 
fixed proportions: 
 
},{min iii LKQ   
 
for i = a, b, and c.  Factors of production are supplied perfectly inelastically in their respective markets, and firms 
bid for these resources competitively by submitting demand schedules which are then aggregated to form market 
demand.  Factor supply then determines the equilibrium results.   
 
When inputs are available at no cost and with no constraints, the Nash/Bertrand equilibrium has each firm 
producing 75 units, pricing output at 25, and utilizing 75 units each of capital and labor, with each factor priced at 
zero.  Firm profits are 1,875 each. If there is less than 225 units of labor or capital available, a symmetrical 
outcome that has each of the firms obtaining 1/3 of the scarcest input is assumed, and we rationalize an equilibrium 
in which firms produce as much as they can, given the scarcity of the input, and that output prices rise accordingly.  
We also anticipate that firms will bid up the price of the scarce input to equal the price of the output.  (The argument 
for this equilibrium outcome is developed more fully in Waldron, Allgrunn, and Pei, 2010).   
 
We conducted this experiment in a single extended class period in a graduate level class, with students 
being assigned to the three “firms” randomly.  Twenty one rounds of the game were conducted following a brief 
explanation of the game, and students were told that a modest portion of their grade might depend on game 
performance to induce a serious effort.  Students were not explicitly provided with specific parameters of the game, 
such as demand functions and factor endowments, but each round’s information was displayed on a screen 
observable by everyone, so inferring factor availability in particular was fairly easy.  The first six rounds of the 
game were played with “abundant” factor endowments of L = K = 240; in rounds 7 – 16 total capital availability 
was constrained to K = 120, with labor remaining at L = 240.  Given participants’ inexperience, we assumed it 
would take a few rounds of experimentation for players to gravitate towards the equilibrium; from our own 
experience with the prior experiment, we believed it might take even more rounds to approach the equilibrium with 
the capital supply constraint.   
 
Finally, anticipating that the scarce input would eventually capture all of the possible rents, absorbing all 
potential firm profit, we conducted rounds 17 – 21 with price controls in the labor market, establishing a minimum 
wage of 30 for each unit of L hired.  Absent this price control, we expected the rent for capital, in short supply, to be 
bid up to 60; thus we anticipated that the price control would redistribute factor payments more evenly, without 
causing a change to output levels or prices.  These conditions are summarized in Table 1 below, with Q showing 
firm output, p being the price of the final good, w representing labor’s wage rate, and r showing the rental price of 
capital: 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Conditions and Expected Outcomes 
Rounds Conditions Anticipated Outcomes 
1 – 6  L = K = 240 
No price controls 
w = r = 0 
L = K = Q = 25 for each firm 
p = 25 for each firm 
Profits = 1875 for each firm 
7 – 16  K = 120 
L = 240 
No price controls 
r = 60 
w = 0 
L = K = Q = 40 for each firm 
p = 60 for each firm 
Profits = 0 for each firm 
17 – 21  K = 120 
L = 240 
Minimum wage for L: 30 
r = 30 
w = 30 
L = K = Q = 40 for each firm 
p = 60 for each firm 
Profits = 0 for each firm 
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EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
 
 We show the results of our experiment in the figures below.  Figure 1 shows the prices for the final good 
set by each firm for each round, along with our anticipated Nash/Bertrand equilibrium price.  Figure 2 shows profits 
for each firm, along with our anticipated equilibrium profits.  Figure 3 displays the equilibrium labor wage and 
rental price of capital in the input markets, as determined by the aggregated firm demand schedules and the fixed 
quantities of inputs available for supply; we also display the anticipated equilibrium prices in the input markets. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Output Prices 
 
 
After a wide variance in prices in the first round, all firms began pricing at or very near the expected price 
of 25, and continued to do so over the initial six rounds.  Our previous experiment had showed an apparent 
reluctance on the part of firms to adjust prices to reflect the supply conditions when an input’s availability was 
severely limited, and once again we find that output prices did not adjust rapidly following the supply shock limiting 
capital’s availability.  Nonetheless, beginning in round seven prices did begin to rise remarkably consistently for ten 
rounds until they reach the expected equilibrium.  Once the wage controls were introduced in round seventeen, there 
was initially a continued push for higher prices by a couple of the firms, but it is unclear whether the players were 
motivated by an interest in recapturing the profit that would now go to pay wages, or simply continuing the trend 
from previous rounds.  In any case, firms quickly reverted back to near-equilibrium pricing during the final rounds 
of the game, whereupon it appears that convergence in pricing strategies had been reached. 
 
 One might expect that the initial rounds, and the final rounds, would have shown profit levels that were as 
consistent as the pricing strategies, but this turns out not to be the case, as shown in Figure 2.  Firms were 
simultaneously choosing output prices and demand schedules for inputs, and these appear to have been somewhat 
difficult for firms to coordinate, leading to volatility in profits.  Relatively small differences in factor bidding had the 
potential to leave firms with either costly excess capacity or insufficient capacity to meet the demand generated by 
output prices.  Firm profits remained positive but generally below the expected levels in rounds 2 – 6, and typically 
lower still but usually positive during the remaining rounds of the game.  There is an overall downward trend in 
profits within the variability in rounds 7 – 16, but it is unclear whether profits were in fact approaching zero as 
predicted.  In the final rounds of the game, when the minimum wage was introduced, profits became more volatile 
than in the rounds immediately preceding the wage control, but did not regularly go to zero. 
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Figure 2: Firm Profits 
 
 
 Initial bidding for inputs kept wage and rental rates near zero, but not precisely zero, with firms possibly 
thinking that a small bid above zero might deprive competitors of their factors of production.   Notwithstanding the 
coordination problems noted above, however, it appears that firms did not attempt to monopolize input markets by 
bidding very high prices in the first few rounds.  The introduction of the capital supply reduction ultimately pushed 
up the equilibrium price of capital, although even after ten rounds it had not risen to the point of capturing all firm 
profits by equaling the output price.  The wage rate quickly moved to zero and generally stayed there as the rental 
price of capital smoothly and consistently rose between rounds 7 – 16.  Interestingly, the minimum wage 
requirement did not have the anticipated effect of splitting the distribution of factor payments between labor and 
capital; instead, firms immediately stopped bidding up the rental rate of capital, and the equilibrium rate moved to 
zero and stayed there for the remainder of the game. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Labor Wages and Capital Rents 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Our earlier experiment confirmed that firms in a simulation would play the Nash/Bertrand strategies that 
theory suggests when inputs are freely available, but left questions about how constrained input availability would 
alter the outcomes, and how price controls on inputs might further alter behavior.  In the current experiment, we 
increased the number of rounds of the game to allow more opportunity for convergence to a stable outcome, and to 
allow for three distinct phases of the game: initial rounds in which inputs were abundantly available, subsequent 
rounds in which one input’s supply was dramatically reduced, and final rounds in which a price floor was 
established on the one input which remained abundant.  As expected, firms played Nash/Bertrand strategies in the 
early rounds.  However, the shock caused by reducing the availability of capital took many rounds for full 
adjustment, with both output prices and the equilibrium rental rate of capital rising consistently and gradually toward 
their projected equilibria over ten rounds, although even then capital prices did not rise enough to absorb all firm 
profits.  Surprisingly, establishing a minimum wage did not have the anticipated effect of balancing payments 
between labor and capital; instead, the minimum wage completely disrupted the trend of an increasing rental price of 
capital and reduced it to zero, while creating volatility in profits without consistently eliminating them.  Overall, we 
find that most of our anticipated results ultimately obtain, but adjustments to variations in market conditions are 
neither immediate nor perfectly consistent with the predictions of theory. 
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